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1  Introduction 
 
From the point of view of a linguist interested in the semantics of spoken language and human 
communication, one of the main attractions of situation theory and situation semantics is the fact that 
they can be applied to so many different aspects of language and communication. In contrast to most 
model-theoretic approaches to semantics (such as Montague Grammar), situation-theoretic framework 
allows us to extend the semantic analysis beyond the realm of propositions and declarative sentences, 
and to treat, within a single unified framework, many aspects of spoken language and communication 
which have hitherto been neglected in semantic theory. I have in mind, for example, such aspects as 
turn-taking, repair, and sequential organization of utterances in conversation, aspects which, until now, 
have mainly been studied under such headings as discourse analysis, conversation analysis and text 
linguistics. 
In the present paper I want to discuss the application of situation theory to the study of face-to-face 
communication, focusing on one particular phenomenon which is typical of spoken language and 
face-to-face communication but which, to my knowledge, has never before been treated within the 
confines of model-theoretic semantics. The phenomenon I want to focus on is what Allwood (1988b, 
1988a) calls linguistic feedback, i. e. "the regular linguistic (and in principle also kinesic) mechanisms 
whereby a speaker and a listener keep each other informed about the following four basic 
communicative functions: (i) maintenance of contact and interaction, (ii) perception. (iii) 
understanding, (iv) attitudinal reactions" (Allwood 1988a:3). As an illustration, consider the following 
transcript of a fragment of a face-to-face conversation between two Swedish university students, 
Gudrun and Kajsa, who are talking about a course in historical linguistics which Gudrun has already 
taken and which Kajsa is about to take. In this passage, Gudrun is telling Kajsa that, during the course, 
she had to draw up the historical development of a particular word on the blackboard.1 
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At one level of analysis, the communicative event in (1) can be analyzed as a simple statement by 
Gudrun. At a more fine-grained level, however, we find that this statement is realized through a whole 
sequence of smaller events involving both participants. First of all, we may note that Kajsa gives 
                                                          
1
  The transcript is organized as follows. Lines beginning with a person's name (GUDRUN or KAJSA) are 
speech lines containing an ortographic transcription of the words uttered by that person; underlining marks heavy 
stress, and numbers in parentheses indicate pause length in seconds. Shadowing in the speech line marks gaze 
aversion (see below section 2.4). The indented line immediately below a speech line contains information about 
hand gestures or head gestures, as indicated by the word HEAD or HAND occurring at the beginning of the line. 
Shadowing here indicates the extension of a gesture, the nature of which is specified in angle brackets (e. g. R H 
SWEEP R for "right hand sweep right", and NOD for "head nod"). 
2
  English translation of Gudrun's utterance: I had to write on the board you know (0.2) how a word had changed 
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feedback, by uttering the word mmm and nodding her head, in the middle of Gudrun's statement. And 
the occurrence of this feedback utterance is certainly not random. On the contrary, I want to argue that 
Gudrun, in the first part of her utterance, elicits feedback from her auditor. 
 
In the present paper I will try to do three things. First, I will show how a communicative situation like 
(1) can be represented in a situation-theoretic framework. Second, I will discuss different flows of 
information in such a situation (with special reference to feedback processes). Third, I will discuss how 
these flows of information can be explained in terms of (conditional) constraints on communicative 
situations. The main purpose of the paper is not to present a descriptively adequate account of 
linguistic feedback in face-to-face communication, but to illustrate, in a principled way, how situation 
theory can be used in the study of human communication. 
 
 
2  Representing Communicative Situations 
 
In this section I will build up the necessary apparatus for representing situations of face-to-face 
communication within a situation-theoretic framework. I will mainly use the notation and terminology 
of Barwise & Perry (1983), because it is the most perspicuous notation I know of for representing 
dynamic situations of the sort we are interested in here (i. e. events and courses of events), especially 
when we are dealing with large situations (i.e. situations supporting a large number of facts). I will also 
introduce a slight modification to make the notation even more perspicuous. 
The interpretation of the notation, however, will be more in line with recent developments in 
situation theory and situation semantics (notably, the more recent articles in Barwise 1989). Thus, I 
will say, for example, that a course of events supports (rather than consists of) a set of located facts of 
the following form: <at l: r, a1, ..., an; i>, where l is a spatiotemporal location, r is a relation, a1, ... an 
is an argument sequence appropriate for r, and i is a polarity. 
Face-to-face communication is multi-channel communication so in representing communicative 
situations we must be able to represent facts about agents being involved in different kinds of 
communicative behavior along different communication channels. In this paper, I will restrict my 
attention to four kinds of communicative behavior: speech, hand gestures, head gestures, and gaze. 
 
2.1  Speech 
 
Following Barwise & Perry (1983), I will assume that a communicative situation may support facts 
about who is speaking and what the speaker is saying. In order to represent such facts, Barwise and 
Perry assume a one-place relation speaking (holding of speakers) and a two-place relation saying 
(holding between speakers and the expressions they utter). For example, the course of event (1) can be 
partially characterized in the following way: 
 
(2)  in e: at l1: speaking, gudrun; 1 
 saying, gudrun, I had to write on the; 1 
 speaking, karin; 0 
 
I assume that there is a structural constraint on (communicative) situations to the effect that if a 
situation s supports the fact < at 1: speaking, a; 0> for some location 1 and individual a, then s does 
not support <at 1: saying, a, α; 1> for any expression α, and if s supports <at l: saying, a, α; 1> for 
some location 1, individual a, and expression a, then s does not support <at l: speaking, a; 0>. 
 
2.2  Hand gestures 
 
Hand gestures of different kinds constitute an important means of communication in face-to-face 
communication (cf. Kendon.1986). In the present context, however, I am interested in hand gestures 
primarily as an indication of the speaker role (cf. Duncan 1973). Therefore, I will not distinguish 
between different kinds of gesture, but simply assume a relation gesticulating, which holds of an agent 
who is engaged in hand gesticulation. For example, the following is another partial characterization of 
the course of event (1): 
 
(3)  in e: at l1: gesticulating, gudrun; 1 
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2.3  Head gestures 
 
Head gestures, notably nods and shakes, are important as feedback signals in face-to-face 
communication. I will therefore assume three one-place relations: nodding, shaking, and moving 
head, with the following structural constraints: 
 
(i)  if a situation s supports the fact <at l: nodding, a 1> for some location 1 and agent a, then s does 
not support <at l: shaking, a; 1>, nor does it support <at l: moving head, a; 0>; 
 
(ii)  if a situation s supports the fact < at l: shaking, a; 1> -for some location 1 and agent a, then s 
does not support <at l: nodding, a; 1>, nor does it support <at l: moving head, a; 0>; 
 
(iii)  if a situation s supports the fact <at l: moving head, a; 0> for some location l and agent a then s 
supports neither < at 1: nodding, a; 1> nor <at l: shaking, a; 1>. 
 
2.4  Gaze 
 
The term gaze is used in the literature to refer to a person's looking behavior, which is known to have 
an important regulatory function in face-to-face communication (cf. Argyle & Cook 1976). For dyadic 
conversations like the one illustrated in (1), we can get by with a rough two-way distinction between 
looking and not looking at the other participant. For reasons that will become apparent later, I will take 
averting gaze (i. e. not looking at the other participant) as the basic relation here. Thus, we may add 
the following to our partial characterization of (1): 
 
(4)  in e: at l1: averting gaze, gudrun; 1 
 
2.5  Representing Communicative Situations - An Example 
 
The communicative situation represented in transcript form in (1) can now be represented in 
situation-theoretic terms as in (5). 
Two comments are in order here. The first concerns the notation, which differs from that of 
Barwise & Perry (1983) in one respect. To enhance perspicuity, I have used indentation to indicate that 
the location of a fact (or set of facts) is temporally included in the location of the preceding fact (or set 
of facts). Thus, for example, the locations 13 and 14 are both temporally included in the location 12. 
 The second comment concerns the problem of knowing what to include in the representation. For 
example, should the fact that Karin (the auditor) is not speaking (except at 12) be present at every 
location? The principle I have adopted here is to include on the one hand all positive facts, and on the 
other hand all changes from positive to negative facts or from negative to positive facts, but this is 
certainly a principle that could be debated. 
 
(5) e : =  at l1:  gesticulating, gudrun; 1  
   averting gaze, gudrun; 1  
   saying, gudrun, I had to write on the; 1  
  at l2:  gesticulating, gudrun; 0  
   averting gaze, gudrun; 0  
    at 13: saying, gudrun, board you know; 1  
    at 14. speaking, gudrun; 0  
     saying, kajsa, mmm;J 
     nodding, kajsa; 1  
  at l5:  gesticulating, gudrun; 1  
   averting gaze, gudrun; 1  
   saying, gudrun, how a word; 1  
  at l6:  averting gaze, gudrun; 0  
   at l7: saying, gudrun, had; 1  
   at l8: gesticulating, gudrun; 0  
   saying, gudrun, changed 1 
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 (l1< l2 < l5 < l6) 
 (l3, l4 ⊆t l2)  
 (l3 < l4)  
 (l7, l8 ⊆t  l6)  
 (l7 < l8) 
 
 
3  Flows of Information 
 
In this section I want to consider different information flows (with special reference to feedback) in the 
communicative course of event e in (5). In order to do this, it will be convenient to divide the situation 
into three major subevents (or subcourses of events), the first of which is represented in (6) as the 
event e1. 
 This event can be regarded as a (complex) communicative act performed by Gudrun, which allows 
Kajsa to pick up at least two different kinds of information. First, there is the propositional information 
carried by Gudrun's utterance I had to write on the board you know, i. e. what Ba.rwise (1989) calls the 
primary content of the utterance. But there is also another kind of information which is carried by e1, 
namely the information that Gudrun wants Kajsa to acknowledge her utterance, i. e. to signal whether 
she has heard the utterance, understood it, and accepted it as a contribution to the conversation. In 
other words, the event e1,  combines the transfer of propositional information with feedback elicitation 
(Allwood 1988b, 1988a). 
 
(6) e1 : = at l1:  gesticulating, gudrun; 1  
  averting gaze, gudrun; 1  
  saying, gudrun, I had to write on the; 1  
 at l2:  gesticulating, gudrun; 0  
  averting gaze, gudrun; 0  
   at by l3,: saying, gudrun, board you know; 1 
 
There are two features of the event  e1,  which are crucial for the feedback eliciting function. The first 
is the change from gaze aversion to mutual gaze which occurs at l2,. The second is the completion of 
the clause I had to write on the board you know (with a prosodic marker) which occurs at 13.3  In 
addition, we may note that the completion of the clause involves, on the one hand, a strong prosodic 
marker (heavy stress on board) and, on other hand, a tag particle (originally the Swedish word dá, 
which literally means "then" but which is better translated here as "you know"), which often seems to 
combine the function of a boundary marker with that of a feedback eliciting signal. 
 
(7) e2 : = at l4.  speaking, gudrun; 0  
saying, kajsa, mmm; 1  
nodding, kajsa; 1 
 
The second event e2, which is represented in (7), is a communicative act performed by Kajsa in 
response to the preceding utterance and feedback elicitation from Gudrun. This event carries three 
kinds of information, which can be described as backward-looking, present-looking, and 
forward-looking, respectively (CL Barwise & Perry 1983). First, it carries the (backward-looking) 
information that Kajsa has recognized the feedback elicitation from Gudrun (cf. event e1). Secondly, it 
carries the (present-looking) information that Kajsa acknowledges Gudrun's preceding utterance (i. e. 
that she has heard, understood, and accepted the utterance). Thirdly and finally, it carries the (forward 
looking) information that Kajsa wants Gudrun to go on talking (or, at least, does not want to interrupt 
her). 
                                                          
3
 It is not clear whether the relevant notion of "clause" here is "grammatical clause" (as argued by Duncan 1975) 
or "phonemic clause" (as suggested by Dittman & Unwell 1967). There is also the possibility that either will do, or 
that the two must coincide (as in fact they do in e1). 
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 The first two pieces of information can be explained from the fact that the word mmm accompanied 
by a head nod (or vice versa) is a conventional feedback signal in a context of this type. To explain the 
third piece of information, we have to consider also the absence of any (turn-claiming) speaker signals 
(e. g. audible inhalation, gesticulation, gaze aversion) on the part of Kajsa. 
 
(8) e3 : = at l5:  gesticulating, gudrun; 1 
averting gaze, gudrun; 1  
saying, gudrun, how a word;  
 1 at l6:  averting gaze, gudrun; 0  
  at l7: saying, gudrun, had; 1  
  at l8: gesticulating, gudrun; 0  
   saying, gudrun, changed 1 
 
The third event e3, which is represented in (8), is a communicative act by Gudrun of roughly the same 
kind as e1 above (and, as far as the propositional content is concerned, a continuation of the latter). 
Besides the propositional content of the utterance how a word had changed, the event carries three 
kinds of information. First, it carries the (backward-looking) information that Gudrun has recognized 
Kajsa's acknowledgement of Gudrun's preceding utterance. (If she had not, she would almost certainly 
have initiated a repair or pursued a further response at this point.) Secondly, its initial part carries the 
(present-looking) information that Gudrun wants to continue speaking (in virtue of the gaze aversion 
and gesticulation at l5). Thirdly, it carries the (forward-looking) information that Kajsa should 
acknowledge the utterance (in virtue of the change from gaze aversion to mutual gaze and the 
completion of a clause; cf. e1 above). 
 
 
4  Constraints 
 
In this section I want to discuss how the flows of information treated in the last section can be 
explained in terms of (conditional) constraints on (communicative) situations, constraints to which the 
participants of a conversation, as members of a linguistic community, are attuned. 
I will assume that the events e1, e2 and e3 (which are subevents of the course of events e) represent 
three different event-types, each of which is involved in a different set of (conditional) constraints. We 
may call these event-types feedback elicitation (cf. e1 and e3), feedback giving (cf. e2) and feedback 
follow-up (cf. e3). In the following discussion I will restrict my attention to the first of these 
event-types, i. e. feedback elicitation. 
The event-type feedback elicitation can be tentatively defined in the following way (using 
uppercase italics as indeterminates): 
 
(11) E1 : = at L1: speaking, X; 1  
addressing, X, Y; 1  
averting gaze, X; 1  
 at L2:  speaking, X; 1  
  addressing, X, Y; 1  
  averting gaze, X; 0  
  averting gaze, Y; 0  
 at L3:  completing clause, X; 1 
 
(L1 < L2 < L3) 
 
Now what information does an event of this type generally carry? I want to suggest that it carries the 
information that in a short while (i.e. at near future location), the speaker will make a pause, 
maintaining mutual gaze, and expecting the auditor to give feedback. In other words, an event of type 
E1 generally involves an event of the following type (where the location L4 is related to the locations 
of E1 in the appropriate way): 
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(12) E2 : = at L4: speaking, X; 0  
averting gaze, X; 0  
expecting FB from, X, Y; 1 
 
In other words, I assume that there is a constraint C 1 to the effect that E1. involves E2. It is in virtue of 
this constraint that the event e1 (and also the event e2) carries the information that the current speaker 
(Gudrun) is expecting feedback from the auditor (Kajsa). And it is in virtue of being attuned to this 
constraint that Kajsa is able to pick up this piece of information. 
In a similar fashion, we can define the event-types feedback giving and feedback follow-up and 
spell out the constraints that allow events of these types to carry the information that they do. I will not 
do that here, however. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have tried to show how situation theory can be applied to the study of face-to-face 
communication. I hope I have succeeded at least in making plausible that such a study, comprising a 
broader class of phenomena than that which has traditionally been studied in model-theoretic 
semantics, can ultimte1y result in a unified situation-theoretic model of linguistic communication. I 
also hope that the study of linguistic feedback that I am currently engaged in myself may have 
something to contribute to that development. 
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